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VOLUME XIV. JULY, 1939 NUMBER 3
A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE
1939 WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE
EUGENE C. LUcOOOK* and] MAX KAINOFFt
Probably a careful attempt to evaluate legislative activity should
take into consideration the opportunities for enacting bad laws
which were avoided and the opportunities for enacting good laws
which were passed by. A comparative analysis of what the legisla-
ture has refused to do as well as what it has done might better
reflect the operation of political democracy at work than a bare
survey of the "end products", so to speak, as reflected in the paper
and ink additions to the body of existing law. In the instance of
the twenty-sixth session of the Washington Legislature, the latter
consist of only two hundred and twenty-five new statutes, the gov-
ernor having relieved the people of six,' out of a total of around
one thousand and seventy-five bills introduced into both houses.
Considering a limited session of sixty days, the product numeri-
cally may fairly be taken as representing 'much labor in sifting and
trading, if not in debate or scientific examination of all the pro-
posals. A mere glance at the figures serves to emphasize the
suggestion commonly made that government by legislation is car-
ried on in camera, at least in committee, rather than in open session
on the floor of the houses and by open debate.
There is much in the current legislation to suggest that the
legislative mind was concentrated upon social welfare of the cur-
rent type, co-operation with the federal government in its welfare
programs, and succumbing to group pressure where the voting
interest seemed to be the strongest. But this alone is not a fair
summary of the legislative work; for after all, the people taken
together or in groups are entitled to have their needs and desires
attended to by the legislature and much that is done without
*Acting associate professor of law, University of Washington.
tPresident, Student Editorial Board of the Washington Law Review,
1938-1939.
IS. B. 150 relating to compensation of officers of third and fourth class
cities; S. B. 204 creating a State Commission on Interstate Cooperation;
S. B. 357 relating to qualifications for the practice of law; S. B. 382 relating
to pilchard reduction plants; H. B. 257 creating a State Library Commis-
sion; and H. B. 268 limiting organization expenses of insurance companies.
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opposition comes from the administrative and executive depart-
ments with the design of improving existing governmental ma-
chinery. Such, for example, seems to have been the origin of the
statute amending the Revenue Act of 1935, covering the occupation
and sales taxes, this latest revision covering 43 pages and containing
in all, 35 sections.' In the same category is the statute3 creating
the new Social Security Committee consisting of the Governor, the
Director of Finance, Budget and Business, and a third member
who shall not be a state officer or employee, to be appointed by
the Governor. The design of this legislation is apparently to
concentrate control over the administration of public relief funds
in state officers while leaving the handling of relief cases in the
hands of a local administration so far as compatible with a uniform
state policy.' An interesting sidelight is furnished by the veto of
section 22 which provided for a series of appeals with the purpose
of obtaining the ultimate decision of the supreme court on the
question of eligibility, an elaboration of the provisions contained
in the former law.2 Somewhat similar provisions for review are
contained in the statute relating to old age assistance."
The progress being made by the state in extending its activities
into the field of private enterprise is measured by at least three
acts: Chapter 45 authorizes port districts in counties of the first
class (which does not include the Port of Seattle, King County
being a Class A county) to establish industrial development dis-
tricts; the statute reading as if some port districts desire to embark
upon industrial real estate promotions, using tax delinquent land
as the initial capital and tax supported bonds for running expenses.
In comparison, the County Homesite Lands Act7 is also based on the
existence of much tax delinquent land but is designed to encourage
the return of such land to private productive use by offering it
to "homesteaders", much in the manner that the western country
was opened to settlement. This legislation is hardly in the class
of business enterprise. However, enlarging the activities of the
'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 225, p. 976.
'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 216, p. 864.
'Id. at § 4, p. 866, requires that the county administrator be selected out
of a panel of eligible nominees furnished by the State Social Security Com-
mittee; but § 13 (p. 873) allows the Committee to move in by establishing
its own regional program of assistance.
'Wash. Laws 1937, c. 180, § 12, p. 697, also relating to public assistance,
repealed by Wash. Laws 1939, c. 216, § 35, p. 864, except as to § 11.
'See Wash. Laws 1937, c. 156, § 6, p. 551. The definition of "need" calcu-
lated to overcome the interpretation of Conant v. State, 97 Wash. Dec. 19,
84 P. (2d) 378 (1938) is the same in both c. 25, p. 80, amending Wash. Laws
1935, c. 182 as amended by Wash. Laws 1937, c. 156, relating to old age
assistance, and c. 216, p. 864, relating to public assistance (see § 17, p. 874).
'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 201, p. 684.
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state in the establishment of food processing plants8 must be char-
acterized as distinctly an increase in public commercial activity
even though the purpose be as stated "for the benefit of needy
persons, public institutions, schools and school aid groups and
organizations, educational, co-operative and charitable institutions
and other organizations working for the public good." Perhaps
the last few words need no emphasis.
The third and most important business enterprise for the state
authorized by this legislature is the low cost housing project sim-
ilar to the federal project already familiar to the public through
press comments and other literature. The device selected is the
"Housing Authority" which the act creates in each city and in
each county of the state as a public corporation, subject to the
right of the governing body of the city or county to prevent the
corporation from functioning by failing to pass a resolution de-
claring that there is need for the local corporation to operate.'
The powers granted to these corporations are very broad, 0 and are
coupled with express power to borrow money for corporate pur-
poses,"1 but seemingly no power is granted to levy taxes. These
corporations may, however, pledge their property and revenues,1
and their real property only is exempted from judgment liens and
executions. 8 On the other hand, all the property of these corpora-
tions, real and personal, is exempt from taxation. 4  Apparently
federal money is expected to do the initial financing.'5 In addition,
by a supplemental act'16 cities, towns, counties and about all public
bodies of the state are enabled to give co-operation of a substantial
kind, not only in the formation of plans of the Authority involving
public lands, park areas, streets and highways, but also to the
extent of investing any money under their control in Authority
bonds and to the extent of lending or donating money directly to
the Authority.17 The expected source of such loans and donations
by other public bodies is not disclosed; but it is deelared' 8 that the
assistance to the Housing Authority provided for "constitutes a
public use and purpose and an essential governmental function for
which public monies may be spent and other aid given".
'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 120, p. 334.
$Wash. Laws 1939, c. 23, p. 53; § 4, p. 57.
21Id. at § 8, p. 60.
111d. at §§ 14, 15, 16, pp. 66-70.
"Id. at § 16, p. 68.
"Id. at § 20, p. 72.
-'Id. at § 22, p. 73 (includes exemption from special assessments).
21id. at § 21, p. 72.
"'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 24, p. 75.
'Id. at §§ 4, 5, 6, pp. 77-79.
"'Id. at § 2, p. 75.
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REGULATORY LxIsILTIoN
As usual, the legislature found occasion to enlarge the scope of
existing regulatory laws; the perennial, or better, the biennial
subject of workmen's compensation and medical aid accounting
for no less than four chapters of the session laws. The definitions
of "extra hazardous employment", of "employer", and of "de-
pendents", are changed somewhat. 19 Changes are made in the
scheme of control over medical aid contracts.20 The definition of
occupational diseases is elaborated. 21 A new schedule of contribu-
tions including occupational diseases is provided.2 2 And Chapter
184, p. 579, now gives to the verdict of a jury, on appeal to th
superior court, the same effect as a verdict in actions at law, and
all right to introduce new evidence in court is taken away, the
appeal being upon the record before the department as to all
parties.
In regard to the regulation of the issuance and sale of securities
in the state, the decision of the supreme court in the Petroleum
Lease Properties Co. case," seems to have met with response in the
statute24 requiring licenses for the persons engaged in the selling,
and also for the issuance of, oil, gas and mining leases, which are
defined as including "any instrument or instruments conveying
title to oil, gas, metalliferous or non-metalliferous rights on a piece
of real property exclusive of the title to the real property". The
licensing feature of the act with respect to the issuance (sale) of
such rights is of the negative sort, patterned after the "registra-
tion" requirement of the federal securities act,2 5 the company or
person wishing to sell such rights at public sale (an offering of
three or more "leases" to residents of the state of Washington)
being required to "file" a verified statement, called a "statutory
statement"; but such filing is not to take place until the Director
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 41, p. 119. Extra-hazardous employment is defined
to include the installing and servicing of radios and electrical refrigerators;
using power-driven machinery in shoe repair shops is eliminated § 1);
the definition of employer restricts the application of the Workmen's
Compensation Act to employments in extra-hazardous work "by way of
trade or business", or the employment of one or more persons in extra-
hazardous work when "the personal labor" of the workman is the essence
of the contract (§ 2) cf. Vance v. Dept., 188 Wash. 278, 62 P. (2d) 450
(1936); house painter taking job for lump sum an independent contractor
and not an employee; the definition of dependents is enlarged by raising
the age of minor dependency to eighteen and naming as dependents "any
invalid child" without regard to age (§ 2).
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 50, p. 158.
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 135, p. 382.
"2Wash. Laws 1939, c. 138, p. 388.
'Petroleum Lease Properties Company v. Huse, 195 Wash. 254, 80 P.
(2d) 774 (1938).
2'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 110, p. 314.
"'Id. at § 3, p. 315; c. 48 Stat. 77-79 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77 (e) to (h).
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of Licenses is satisfied that it is "complete and definite and found
to comply with the provisions of this act" (the act specifying seven
subjects which the statement is required to cover in detail). The
Securities Act is likewise amended by this session ;2 but the title
appears to be untouched so far as making it broad enough to cover
"leases" is concerned, although the definition of securities covered
by the act so as to include oil and gas leases, which definition was
held invalid in this particular in the case cited because of the
narrow title, is retained. Perhaps the major changes in the Securi-
ties Act are represented by the new provision relative to pre-
organization subscriptions to the shares of domestic and foreign
corporations,2 7 and by the new provision defining the right to
recover the purchase price of securities sold or contracted to be
sold in violation of the act and fixing a two-year period of limitation
upon such actions.
28
Second-hand watches are hardly in the same class of investments
as stocks and bonds, or even oil and gas leases, but the legislature
has apparently discovered enough fraud in the business of selling
this sort of property to justify regulating the business. Chapter
89, P. 247, requires a tag to be affixed to the watch labeling it as
second-hand and a written invoice to be delivered to the vendee
fixing the responsibility of the vendor as seller of that particular
watch, but whatever his responsibility in law is to be, is not stated,
the misdemeanor consisting in failure to label or to deliver the
invoice rather than in the sale of the watch.
Chapter 211, P. 798, contains comprehensive regulations govern-
ing the registration and purity of commercial animal foods, fer-
tilizers, and livestock remedies, and the labeling, advertising and
sale thereof. So far as the ordinary person in his use of such
products may be concerned, the act is equipped with sufficient
prohibitions and effective controls to protect the average user
against having either harmful or worthless commodities foisted
upon him under the guise of fancy names.
The health of eaters of candy has also become the subject of the
legislative solicitude, 9 1 and likewise the health of those who enjoy
macaroni.80 The latter product, however, seems to be more subject
to cut-throat competition since the act includes fair trade provisions,
even to the extent of specifying as unlawful the defaming of com-
petitors by imputing dishonorable conduct, inability to perform
'-Wash. Laws 1939, c. 124, p. 347.
"Id. at § 2, p. 349.
Id. at § 4, p. 352.
"'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 112, p. 319.
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 190, p. 633.
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contracts, or questionable credit standing; or by disparaging the
grade, quality or manufacture of the competitor's products, or his
business methods. On the other hand, Chapter 199, P. 673, desig-
nated as the Washington State Honey Act, has as its particular
aim the protection of the work of the state honey bee from abuse
and adulteration; otherwise the appearance of the "Washington
state honey seal" on each container, as required by the act, would
be very misleading.
The dairy industry of the state is to be promoted by two acts.
By the provisions of one,"' a corporation to be known as the Wash-
ington State Dairy Products Commission is created, the business
of which is to carry on scientific research into the health, food,
therapeutic, dietetic, and industrial uses of milk products, and to
increase the domestic and national markets for Washington dairy
products by advertising. The revenue of the corporation is to be
supplied by a tax upon butter fat and upon untested milk and
creami.
The functions of the Washington State Apple Advertising Com-
mission have also been expanded to include research "to establish
further and additional uses for apples and particularly cull
apples", duly supported by an appropriate tax per basket on culls.2
On the same note, the low state of the apple industry has tempted
the legislature to revive for that industry the lately discredited
device of coupling the prohibition of unfair trade practices and the
limitation of the supply of apples by "marketing agreement" or
order of the Director of Agriculture ;83 the declared purpose being,
in part, to raise the income of the apple producers, as was also the
declared purpose under the former Washington Agriculture Ad-
justment Act with respect to farmers generally. 4 The primary
hurdle to be surmounted by the apple act is the same as proved
an effective obstacle to the Agriculture Adjustment Act, namely,
the delegation of legislative power to the Director of Agriculture.
the Governor, and to the handlers and producers.8 5 The orders to
be promulgated by the director are to be based upon marketing
agreements and cannot be made effective without the consent or
agreement of the handlers of at least fifty per cent of the volume
of apples produced or marketed in the state, and two-thirds of the
producers who "during the representative period determined by
the director" have been engaged in the production of apples for
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 219, p. 909.3Wash. Laws 1939, c. 222, p. 931.
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 224, p. 958.
"Wash. Laws, Extra Sess. 1933, c. 12, p. 26.
"See Wash. Laws 1939, c. 224, §§ 5-10 and §§ 13-17.
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market or for sale in this state. The orders are to provide at least
for the limitation of the quantity of inferior apples marketed; or
to provide allotments of quantity of any apples which any handler
will be allowed to purchase; or to provide for the allotting of the
quantity which any handler may market or transport to any market.
The only legislative standard provided for these regulations is the
amount sold by producers, or the amount shipped by handlers, "in
such prior period as the director determines to be representative' .86
In addition, the orders may provide definition of unfair trade
practices and unfair methods of competition, and almost anything
else related to the marketing of apples. 7 The orders are binding
upon all handlers and producers to the extent the director thinks
the marketing agreement and/or order should provide;88 and
orders may be issued without regard to the handlers, if the Gov-
ernor approve and two-thirds of the defined producers "approve"
or "favor" them.39  In terms, all dealers and brokers of apples
are covered by the act, which suggests that the dealer or broker
who buys to ship out of the state may find the act objectionable as
imposing a burden upon interstate commerce, for the inclusion of
handlers is not restricted to such as handle apples marketed within
the state, but to those who handle the apples "produced or mar-
keted within this state", as well as all the producers who have
been engaged in the "production for market of apples or who ....
have been engaged in the production of apples for sale in this
state".4 0  The suppression of competition still appears to be a
desirable feature of this sort of regulation since by this act the
legislature in effect legalizes it, 41 in spite of the provisions con-
tained in Section 22 of Article XII of the state constitution. It
is yet possible for the supreme court to change its collective mind
on the scope of the constitutional prohibition.4 2
The legislature provided a new commission merchants act,43 in
lieu of the Act of 1937 which is repealed. The new act adds "the
3See Id. at § 9, p. 963.
'Cf. Uhden, Inc. v. Greenough, 181 Wash. 212, 43 P. (2d) 983 (1935);
Griffiths v. Robinson, 181 Wash. 438, 43 P. (2d) 977 (1935); State v. Matson
Co., 182 Wash. 507, 47 P. (2d) 1003 (1935). But, perhaps, reliance is now
placed upon cases like Mulford v. Smith, - U. S. -, 83 L. ed. Adv.
Op. 628 (1939) and Currin v. Wallace, - U. S. -, 83 L. ed. Adv. Op. 413
(1939).
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 224, §§ 7, 8, 15, pp. 962, 967.
1Id. at § 14, p. 966.
"See §§ 4 and 13, pp. 961 and 966, and § 14, p. 967 of c. 224. Compare
the decision in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, - U. S. -, 83
L. ed. Adv. Op. 276 (1939).
1Id. at § 5, p. 962.
'Cf. Opinions in the Uhden and Griffiths cases, note 37, supra.
"2Wash. Laws 1939, c. 197, p. 653.
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credit buyer" and regulates him along with the commission
merchant, distinguishing between dealers who are "commission
merchants and credit buyers" and dealers who are "cash" buyers.
Both classes are required to obtain licenses but only the commission
merchant and credit buyer are required to furnish a bond. A new
ground for declining to grant, or for revoking a license, or for
suspending a license, is given the director, viz: attempted payment
by check with insufficient funds or stopping payment on a check
given as a cash payment. 44  There are some others. The provisions
of the 1937 Act authorizing a review of the director's orders as to
licenses has been omitted from this act. 45 A new provision allows
the director to bring suit on the commission merchant's and credit
buyer's bond. 46  The recovery is apparently for the benefit of the
consignor and is an additional right of suit. Perhaps this act,
like some of its predecessors, will bear judicial examination. 4 7
UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT
Chapter 221 prohibits certain trade practices; primarily price
discrimination and the use of "loss leaders".
Section 2 of the act provides that it shall be unlawful for one
who deals in articles of "general use", to sell at lower prices in
one section of any community than in another, "with the intent to
destroy . . . competition . . . ,,4" The statute, however, does
permit differences in price based upon "grade, quality, or quantity
when ... justified", as well as differentials based on the "selection
of customers or a functional classification-of any customer as
broker, jobber, wholesaler or retailer." Motion picture films are
exempt from the operation of this section, as are articles sold by
public utilities, services, articles or products for which rates are
established under the Department of Public Service, or similar
services, articles or products of publicly owned utilities.4 5
"Id. at § 38, p. 665.
'Cf. Wash. Laws 1937, c. 67, § 8 (g), p. 219.
'Wash. Laws 1939, § 41, p. 667.
'See State v. Bowen, 86 Wash. 23, 149 Pac. 330 (1915) (1907 act);
Northern Cedar Co. v. French, 131 Wash. 394, 230 Pac. 837 (1924) (1923
act); Garretson Co. v. Robinson, 178 Wash. 601, 35 P. (2d) 504 (1934)
(1933 act).
"A similar provision was held to be constitutional in Wholesale Tobacco
Dealers Bureau of Southern California, Inc. v. National Candy & Tobacco
Co., - Cal. -, 82 P. (2d) 3 (1938); but where the inhibition of the statute
applied regardless of motive, the statute was held to be unconstitutional
in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. C. Minn.,
1938).
"In an action against a tobacco dealer under a similar statute, it was
held that the defendant could not raise the objection that the act was dis-
criminatory because of such exemption. Wholesale Tobacco Dealers
Bureau of Southern California, Inc. v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., -
Cal. -, 82 P. (2d) 3 (1938).
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Any scheme of rebates, etc., the purpose of which is the violation
of the statute is expressly prohibited,50 but the section ends with
the provision that "nothing in the section shall be construed to
prohibit the meeting in good faith of a legal competitive price."51
Section 4 makes unlawful the sale of any article below cost, or
the giving away of any article, "for the purpose of injuring com-
petitors or destroying competition' ,52 or the use of any article as
a "loss leader". 53 It should be noted that "cost" as defined in
Section 1 includes overhead expenses. Thus, resale at invoice cost
will constitute a violation of the act. 4 The cost of goods bought
at forced sale may not be used in establishing cost under this sec-
tion, unless such goods are kept separate from goods purchased in
the ordinary trade channels and are advertised and sold as goods
so bought.55 In any proceeding under the statute an established
cost survey for the particular trade or industry involved is
competent evidence in proving costs; 8 also, when it is alleged and
shown that the person complained against is selling below cost and
is including labor cost at less than the prevailing wage scale in
the trade, evidence of the prevailing wage scale is admissible to
prove intent to evade the statute.57
wThe constitutionality of a similar provision in the Robinson-Patman
Act, 18 U. S. C. § 13, was upheld in Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 96 F. (2d) 687 (1938), affirming the entry of a restraining
order against a brokerage company which acted as intermediary between
buyers and sellers.
BlAccordingly, that situation is listed in § 7 as one to which the act
does not apply.
rIThe constitutionality of a similar provision was upheld in Wholesale
Tobacco Dealers Bureau of Southern California, Inc., v. National Candy &
Tobacco Co., - Cal. -, 82 P. (2d) 3 (1938), and in State v. Langley, -
Wyo. -, 84 P. (2d) 767 (1938); but denied in State v. Packard-Bamberger
& Co., - N. J. -, 2 AtL (2d) 599 (1938), because not limited to business
affected with a public interest. Under such a provision, a complaint which
alleged sale below cost but did not allege that such sale was made with
the intent to injure competition, was held not to state a cause of action:
Balzer v. Caler, - Cal. -, 82 P. (2d) 19 (1938).
99ec. 1 defines "loss leader" to mean any article sold below cost for the
purpose of encouraging the purchase of other merchandise, or which may
have the tendency to mislead purchasers, or which diverts trade from
competitors. Note that under this definition, an intent to injure competi-
tors is not a condition precedent to the application of the inhibition of the
statute, and this provision is accordingly analogous, in such respect, to
the provision held unconstitutional on that ground in Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. C. Minn., 1938).
"'In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. C.
Blinn., 1938) provision that "cost" should be based on the manufacturers'
published list prices, less published discounts, rather than the dealers'
actual cost, was held unconstitutional. That defect is not present in the
Washington statute which concerns itself with actual cost.
rzWash. Laws 1939, c.221, § 5, p. 926.
r'A similar provision was held invalid in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. C. Minn., 1938), on the ground that it was
"vague, indefinite, arbitrary, and discriminatory."
"'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 221, § 6, p. 927.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
It may be pointed out that Section 3 provides for the equal guilt
of any agent who directly or indirectly assists in the violation of
the statute by the principal, and that allegation and proof of the
unlawful intent of the principal shall be sufficient in the prosecu-
tion of the agent. 8
The situations to which the statute does not apply are enumerated
in Section 7, as follows:
1. The closing out, in good faith, of all or a part of the owner's
stock in case of discontinuance of a particular line of goods, or of
seasonal goods, and bona fide sales of perishable goods to prevent
loss by spoilage, provided that notice thereof is given to the public;
2. The sale of damaged goods, provided the public is given notice
thereof;
3. Sales by an officer acting under the orders of any court;
4. Endeavoring in good faith to meet the legal prices of a com-
petitor.
Any contract made in violation of the statute is declared to be
an illegal contract. 9 Any person is authorized to maintain an
action to enjoin violations of the act, and if injured by such viola-
tions may recover damages in addition; but neither allegation nor
proof of actual damages is necessary to maintain the action.6 0
UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT
Chapter 158 enacts the Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Re-
sponsibility Act with some changesY 1 The design of the act is to
compel the carrying of liability insurance by operators and owners
of motor vehicles alike, or the furnishing of the equivalent in the
form of proof of financial ability to respond coupled with a surety
bond or that of two individual sureties, or a cash or collateral
deposit, for the protection of persons and property injured.
"The latter provision is duplicated in § 6. The identical provisions of
the Minnesota Unfair Practices Act were held unconstitutional in Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. C. Minn., 1938), on
the ground that "it is not within the province of a legislature to declare
a person guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime."
O9Wash. Laws 1939, c. 221, § 8, p. 928.
'DId. at § 9, p. 928.
OlThe original act as adopted in 1932 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, is listed in Uniform Laws An-
notated, vol. 11, under the title of "Uniform Automobile Liability Security
Act." The committee which prepared the act was originally known as
the Committee on Compulsory Automobile Insurance, but upon its own
recommendation, its name and purpose were later changed and the present
law is the result of its labors. Pennsylvania appears to be the only other
state which has thus far enacted the uniform act. Massachusetts, how-
ever, "has a compulsory automobile insurance act, and upwards of fifteen
states have so-called 'financial responsibility acts' ", after which the uni-
form act is patterned. 11 U. L. A. 126.
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The method of enforcement is by suspending the operator and
vehicle licenses of the person convicted, or who pleads guilty, or
forfeits bail for any offense which requires the suspension of or
revocation of the licenses of such person, or for "any offense in any
other state which if committed in this state would require the
suspension or revocation of the licenses of such person in this
state." The suspension takes place automatically, and the licenses
remain suspended until proof of financial responsibility is given
the Director of Licenses. Suspension also takes place upon receipt
by the Director of a certificate from the court in which a judgment
for damages for personal injuries in any amount, or for property
damage in excess of $100, has become final and remains unsatisfied
for thirty days. Discharge in bankruptcy is not satisfaction; but
arrangements can be made to pay the judgment in instalments.
Proof of ability to respond in damages in the future is also a
requirement for the renewal of the licenses.
The act is applicable to non-resident motorists. The owner of a
motor vehicle may give proof of his ability to respond in damages
to relieve a person in his employ or a member of his family of the
requirement for making such proof. The proof required may be
made voluntarily in advance of any occasion when suspension
might occur.
The minimum coverage provided for in the act is $5,000 for
personal injury or death of any one person; $10,000 for two or
more, and $1,000 for property damage, in any one accident. The
same figures qualify the requirement for the satisfaction of judg-
ments. Sections 23, 24 and 26 supply specific provisions for, and
restrictions upon motor vehicle liability and operator's policies.
If an owner of a motor vehicle wishes to operate other motor
vehicles not covered by the liability policy on his own car, he may
do well to obtain an operator's policy in addition.
Son, CoNsERvATIoN AN IRRIGATION DISTRICTS
The Soil Conservation District Law2 contemplates control and
prevention of soil erosion through a State Soil Conservation Com-
mittee, which is established as an agency of the state but is not
given corporate character, and through contemplated soil con-
servation districts, the latter being designated as governmental
subdivisions of the state and public corporations. However, the
power to levy taxes or to issue bonds is withheld.6 Apparently,
for financial implementation of the scheme, reliance is placed upon
state appropriations or federal grants. The district supervisors
'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 187, p. 599.
"Id. at § 8.. p. 616.
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compose the legislative body and plans for conservation are to be
promulgated by ordinances containing regulations for land use
and cultivation.6 4 The State Soil Committee is the agency for set-
ting up the districts, upon petition and after a hearing, fixing the
boundaries and determining whether or not a district within the
territory established is necessary and feasible."5 A referendum is
provided but its result seems not to be controlling. One obvious
question relative to the validity of the scheme arises from the fact
that the Committee is not a legislative body while the creation of
governmental subdivisions of the state is a legislative act.66
As to irrigation districts some new provisions are made for the
fairly obvious purpose of co-operating with the federal government
in its plans for developing arid lands with available water supply.
Thus, Chapter 13 authorizes the splitting of districts into "director
divisions" so as to facilitate the allotment of water when it is
available for parts of the district. Chapter 14 adopts as the state
law the provisions of the federal act having for its purpose the
preventing of speculation in lands in the Columbia Basin and
giving aid to actual settlers.6 7  To further facilitate the develop-
ment of irrigable lands, existing districts are authorized to enlarge
their boundaries so as to include additional land susceptible of
irrigation from the water supply and system of works of the dis-
trict.6 8 Looking to the possible sale by any district of its lands,
canals, pipelines and water rights to the federal government.
Chapter 57 is designed to help clear the title by limiting actions by
bondholders to six years after the maturity date of the bond; or,
if the maturity date has been reached, to a period of six months
after the taking effect of the act if such period is more than the
period of limitation provided by the act. Since the act carries an
emergency clause, the effective date is March 10, 1939. Any dis-
trict which has no bonded indebtedness and which has been in
existence for more than twenty years without securing irrigation
of any lands, may liquidate under the provisions of Chapter 149.
"Id. at §§ 7, 8, 9, pp. 614-621.
1Id. at § 5, p. 605.
"See Territory ex rel. Kelly v. Stewart, 1 Wash. 98, 23 Pac. 405 (1890);
State ex rel Higgins v. Aicklen, 167 La. 456, 119 So. 425 (1929); Kenyon
v. Moore, 287 Ill. 233, 122 N. E. 548 (1919). This statute does not seem to
fit the parallel where the legislature authorizes the establishment of
boundaries after a public hearing and a vote on the question of creating
a municipal corporation with such boundaries, or the legislative adoption
of existing municipal corporations as delimiting the boundaries and the
establishment of additional corporations within such boundaries by popu-
lar vote. Compare: Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S.
112 (1896); Lausen v. Board, 204 Iowa 30, 214 N. W. 682 (1927); Royer v.
Public Utility District No. 1, 186 Wash. 142, 56 P. (2d) 1302 (1936).
"Act of Congress, May 27, 1937, 50 Stat. 208.
' Wash. Laws 1939, c. 150, p. 448.
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TAXATION
Several chapters deal with the general system of taxation for
general revenue purposes." Chapter 171 deals with irrigation
district delinquent assessments. No new general taxes are directly
provided; the only approach to additional taxation being found in
the removal of exemptions under the sales tax,70 the increase in the
cigarette tax,7 1 and the substitute fuel oil tax.7 2 It is expected that
a detailed analysis of the changes made by this legislature in the
general tax laws will be made at another time.
CORPORATIONS
The general corporation statute has been amended by Chapter
143; and Chapter 100 introduces the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
These enactments will be commented upon by Professor Ayer.
Public service corporations came in for legislative attention to
the extent of authorizing the Department of Public Service to
assess the costs of an investigation, as it progresses, to the company
being investigated, up to one per cent of its gross operating revenue
from intrastate operations during the preceding calendar year, in
any one year.73 The 1933 law on this subject is repealed. The life
of this particular act was limited by the legislature to March 1,
1941; but this provision the Governor vetoed. The expiration
feature being contained in a part of a section, it may become
necessary to have the effect of the veto determined.74 The require-
ment that all utility corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the
Department of Public Service contribute to a general expense fund
is amplified by an amendatory act;75 the contribution is based on
gross operating revenue from intrastate operations only, and the
"See particularly c. 9, p. 15 (compensating tax, repealed by § 34, c. 225,
at p. 1019); c. 10, p. 20 (tax on insurance companies); c. 16, p. 42 (property
erroneously assessed); c. 37, p. 115 (time for filing budgets or estimates
respecting taxes to be raised by levies according to assessed valuations);
c. 104, p. 300 (installment contracts on delinquencies); c. 116, p. 328 (list-
ing and assessment of personal property held for sale); c. 136, p. 386
(changing designation of taxes and assessments to the year in which they
are due and payable); c. 137, p. 387 (providing for the listing and assess-
ment of real and personal property and for the assessment of personal
property on a monthly average basis in the case of manufacturers' stock);
c. 155, p. 455 (authorizing the segregation and separate payment of the
tax upon improvements owned separately from the fee); c. 202, p. 692 (in-
heritance tax); c. 206, p. 720 (general law amendments); c. 225, p. 976
(occupation and sales tax amendments, Revenue Act of 1935 amended).
"See Wash. Laws 1939, c. 225, § 9, p. 991.
"Id. at § 23, p. 1003.
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 186, p. 581.
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 203, p. 713.
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 203, § 2 (f), p. 715. Cf. Washington Const., Art.
III, § 12.
'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 123, p. 344, amending § 1 of c. 158, Wash. Laws 1937.
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department is authorized to decrease the contributions by classes
for any one year. This feature of the exaction seems to insure it
against attack upon the ground that excessive burdens are placed




Some municipal utilities must be in a thriving condition for the
legislature has authorized the transfer of a part of net earnings
(actual and not merely bookkeeping surplus) to current expenses.7 7
The prosperity is apparently confined to some one, or possibly
more, cities of the fourth class, since the statute is expressly so
limited in its application.
The less satisfactory street railway situation in Seattle called
for legislative aid in the shape of an act enabling the city to take
advantage of available federal funds for refinancing and rehabilita-
tion purposes, in effect lifting the burden from the shoulders of
private investors. Whether the new bondholder is going to be in
a better position than the old may turn in part upon the new
terms authorized for the refunding bonds; the pledge seems still
to be confined to the revenue but the "system" is made to include
all surface transportation methods and not only street railway
transportation.""
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
The legislature adopted a three-day marriage license law,79 and
enacted two adoption statutes: one relating to the persons author-
ized to adopt children 0 and the other to the machinery for the
adoption. 1 These statutes will be the subject of special discussion.
LEGAL AID BUREAU
Chapter 93 authorizes the establishment of legal aid bureaus in
Class A and first-class counties by resolution of the county com-
missioners, to be supported by county funds, the bureaus to be
under the control of the Board of Governors of the Washington
State Bar Association. However, the act specially recognizes the
propriety of the promotion of legal aid by the lawyers of the state
upon their own initiative without public financial support, and this
alternative has been availed of in King County for the immediate
future.
'1Cf. Great Northern R. Co. v. Washington, 300 U. S. 154 (1937).
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 96, p. 265.
'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 47, p. 142.
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 204, p. 716.
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 162, p. 485.
uWash. Laws 1939, c. 163, p. 488. See c. 133, p. 379, providing the record-
ing of a certificate of the decree of adoption and the issuance of birth
certificates.
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WAGE LEGISLATION
Rebating wages for a job in both public and private employ-
ment is made a misdemeanor by Chapter 195. The employer and
any agent of an employer, and an elected public official may be
guilty of violating the act; likewise, any employee who accepts
or continues in the employment of any employer guilty of any
violation of the act, with knowledge thereof, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor. This provision appears to be applicable to any employee
who has knowledge of violations even though he is not himself
implicated. The aggrieved employee may recover twice the amount
of wages rebated or withheld, together with costs of suit and an
attorney's fee, except that a person who has knowingly submitted
to a violation of the act has no recourse -under this provision. The
exception seems to emasculate the remedy.
Chapter 139 authorizes the payment of wages earned at the time
of an employee's death to his widow; or if no surviving spouse,
to his children; or if no children, to his mother or father, without
probate proceedings (if none are instituted), but such payment
must not exceed $300.
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS
Chapter 132 adds creditors whose claims have been duly served
and filedto the list of persons who are entitled to require notice of
the statutorily designated steps in the administration of estates.
Chapter 26 corrects an error in the Probate Code of 1917 relating
to the removal or resignation of an executor or administrator,82
by providing for enlarging the time for filing claims if notice to
creditors had already been published at the time of removal or
resignation, to the extent of the time between the resignation or
removal and publication of notice of such resignation or removal
and a new appointment, instead of reducing the time as provided by
the existing provision.
By Chapter 27 the court is now authorized to dispense with an
executor's and administrator's bond when the petition for letters
is made by or upon the written request of the surviving spouse
and the court is satisfied that the value of the estate does not exceed
the statutory exemptions, and in all other estates when it appears
that the value of the estate does not exceed $500, and that the
rights of heirs and creditors will not be jeopardized thereby..
LnFE INSURANCE
The exemption statute83 has been amended."' The exemption of
'2Wash. Laws 1917, c. 156, § 121, p. 675 (REm. REv. STAT. § 1491, P. C.
§ 984).
"REm REV. STAT. § 7230-1, P. C. § 7854-2.
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 179, p. 546.
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life insurance proceeds has been extended to cover assignments to
any one other than the person effecting the insurance, and the
restriction that there be no contrary provision in the policy
affecting the exemption has been omitted. The exemption is also
made categorically independent of any reserved right to change
the beneficiary, so any contention that an effective assignment of a
policy cannot be made in view of such reservation is apparently
eliminated. But there does not seem to be any intention to change
the rule that assignees for security have priority over named bene-
ficiaries. 5 The omission of the provision that a beneficiary may
maintain an action on the policy in his own name is probably with-
out significance. The new provision is to the effect that beneficiary
or assignee is entitled to the proceeds against the creditors.
Chapter 97 protects insurance companies in paying according
to the terms of the policy to the person named in the policy, or by
a change of beneficiary, or by an assignment. The provisions
apply to life insurance contracts and to accident policies with
respect to death benefits; also to fraternal benefit societies and
certificates, and to annuity contracts. The statute, however,
expressly disclaims any purpose to affect the rights of third persons
to the policy or its proceeds."6 In any case, the statute will not be
a protection if, before payment is made, the insurance company
has received at its home office written notice of a third person's
claim. The purpose of the statute evidently is to remedy the un-
certain position in which insurers find themselves by reason of
the decision in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Powers," wherein
it was held that the husband's change of beneficiary in a life
insurance policy, without his wife's consent, was without effect,
the policy having been paid for with community funds and there-
fore being community property.
The result aimed at by this chapter appears to have been accom-
plished in California by judicial decision.8
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
The duplication in the present statutes with respect to the
recording of chattel mortgages is eliminated by Chapter 121.8'
It is also provided that where a chattel mortgage has been filed
as required by statute and the property is subsequently removed
sSchade v. Western Union Life Insurance Co., 125 Wash. 200, 215 Pac.
521 (1923).
:'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 97, p. 266; § 4, p. 267.
'192 Wash. 475, 74 P. (2d) 27 (1937).
'Blethen v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 198 Cal. 91, 243 Pac. 431
(1926).
"See REM. REV. STAT. § 3788. Cf. In re McNeil, 44 F. (2d) 666 (D. C.
Wash., 1930); filing held to satisfy § 3788.
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to another county, the mortgagee shall file a certified copy of the
mortgage in such latter county either prior to or within thirty
days after such removal. This is a change in the law to the extent
that filing rather than recording is referred to, and to the extent
that filing prior to removal is made effective to protect the
mortgagee.
The further provision is nmade for the benefit of the mortgagee,
that the mortgage remains enforceable, where there is a failure to
file in another county upon removal of the property, not only
against the parties to the mortgage, which is the existing law, but
also against those having actual notice thereof. Prior to this
enactment, failure to record a mortgage upon removal was held
to be fatal as to third parties even with notice 0 Express provision
is made that the effect of filing the mortgage in the county of
removal after the thirty-day period is to restore the operation of
the mortgage as to all parties except purchasers and incumbrancers
in good faith who have become such after the expiration of the
thirty-day period and before such filing.
The effect of a late filing of a chattel mortgage, in cases of
removal, accordingly will differ from the effect of the failure to
make an original filing within the required time of ten days (REm.
REv STAT. § 3781, P. C. § 9747), the rule in such a case being that
filing after the ten-day period is of no effect so far as the filing
constituting constructive notice is concerned. 91
BULK SALES
The Bulk Sales Law is amended by Chapter 122 so as to extend
its operation to "any restaurant, cafe, beer parlor, tavern, hotel,
club or gasoline service station"; and requires the inclusion in the
vendor's affidavit of creditors, a statement of the amounts owing
to employees, as well as a statement of the consideration to be
paid by the vendee. Each of these amendments effects a change
in the existing law. In Garner v. Thompson,92 the Washington
court had held that the Bulk Sales Act did not apply to restaurants.
As to the creditors required to be listed in the affidavit, the existing
provisions refer only to creditors on account of "goods, wares or
merchandise, and/or fixtures and equipment .... or .... money
borrowed . . ." Likewise, prior to this statute, there was no
requirement that the consideration for the sale be stated.
wrurner v. Caldwell, 15 Wash. 274, 46 Pac. 235 (1896).
O'Clark v. Kilian, 116 Wash. 532, 199 Pac. 721 (1921). The court most
likely would have reached the same conclusion with respect to fMling or
recording upon removal to another county. Cf. Turner v. Caldwell, 15
Wash. 274, 46 Pac. 235 (1896).
0:161 Wash. 317, 296 Pac. 1043 (1931). For a contrary holding under an
earlier Bulk Sales Act see Plass v. Morgan, 36 Wash. 160, 78 Pac. 784 (1904).
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BANKS
Chapter 59 provides that stop-payment orders on checks, notes,
drafts or trade acceptances drawn against or payable out of an
account maintained with a branch bank shall have no effect unless
delivered to or made at the branch. The non-independent nature
of the branch bank was recognized in Canadian Bank of Commerce
v. Johnson,93 dealing with a different problem; but the opinion
throws no light upon the precise question dealt with by this statute.
In the absence of statute there appears to be some uncertainty as
to the extent branches are to be treated as independent insti-
tutions94 I
GARNISHMENT--BRANCH BANKS
The present requirements relating to garnishments in superior
court cases when they are directed to banks having branches, 95 are
extended to justice court garnishments by Chapter 70, the require-
ment being that such writs must be directed to the branch and
served upon the manager or other officer "at the office or branch
thereof at which the account evidencing (the) indebtedness of the
defendant is carried, or at the office or branch which has in its
possession or under its control credits or other personal property
belonging to the defendant."
SALE OF PROPERTY UNDER EXECUTION-REDEFPTION
The present redemption law relating to land sold on execution
or foreclosure96 provides that when farm land has remained in
possession of the debtor during the redemption period and is not
redeemed, the purchaser at the sale shall have a lien, upon the
crops raised during the period of possession, for interest upon the
purchase price and for taxes with interest. Chapter 94 substitutes
for "the period of possession" the "year of redemption", and pro-
vides that the lien for taxes refers only to taxes becoming de-
linquent during the year of redemption.
TEST SUITS BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Chapter 153 establishes machinery whereby bond issues by
municipal corporations can be subjected to judicial scrutiny in
advance at the instance of the municipal corporation involved,
instead of requiring bond attorneys to resort to the practice of
315O Wash. 668, 274 Pac. 99 (1929).
"'Cf. 7 Am. JuR., title Banks, § 25, with 9 C. J. S., title Banks and Bank-
ing, § 55.
O'Wash. Laws, Extra Sess., 1933., 1933, c. 44, p. 107; Rzmv. RE v. STAT.
§ 687. This statute expressly provides that the writ in such cases shall be
sufficient to attach accounts, credits, or other personal property only in
that particular branch upon which service is made.
"Wash. Laws 1927, c. 93, § 2, p. 74; REM. REv. STAT. § 602.
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arranging taxpayer test suits for the purpose of enhancing the
marketability of the bonds by obtaining a judgment foreclosing
objections to their legality, in advance of sale. 7 This new statute
authorizes the issuer, after enactment of a bond ordinance, to file
suit against "all taxpayers", as defendants. The court is required
to designate one or more taxpayers as the persons upon whom
service of process is to be had, as representative of all. If the tax-
payers served default, the court is further required to appoint
an attorney to defend the action. Any taxpayer may intervene.
Such a proceeding is to some extent well known in this state in
connection with the statutory method for obtaining confirmation
of the organization of irrigation districts and their proceedings,
including the authorization of bond issues. But in such cases the
decree is in effect a judgment in rem binding upon the property
within the district. 8 The effect of such a proceeding is to quiet
title to the lien created against the property and, on that basis,
does not provide a judicial proceeding where there is no contro-
versy, but carries the characteristic res judicata9 9 In contrast,
the proceeding contemplated by Chapter 153 creates no lien and
does not require that there be a controversy.100 Even the local
Declaratory Judgment Act' 0 ' has been construed as not authorizing
judicial proceedings unless they are adversary in character, involv-
ing "real" issues and "real" parties, and "an actual as distin-
guished from a possible or potential dispute."'10 2
However, statutes of a similar character have been employed in
other states for some years. The Mlississippi statute, for example,
dating at least from 1917, has been sustained as constituting a
proper grant of power to the courts under the state constitution. 0 3
Under statutes of this type, the conclusive effect of the decree has
been held to turn upon the requirement of a general notice to the
taxpayers at large ;104 and in one instance the decree was held not
conclusive on the constitutional validity of the bond issue as to a
G'See Stallcup v. Tacoma, 13 Wash. 141, 42 Pac. 541, 52 Am. SEt. Rep. 25
(1895).
T1weedt v. Puderbaugh, 183 Wash. 425, 48 P. (2d) 648 (1935).
"Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123 (1926).
"'Cf. Muskrat v. U. S., 219 U. S. 346 (1911).
"'Wash. Laws 1935, c. 113, p. 305; amended by Wash. Laws 1937, c. 15,
p. 39; RmL REv. STAT. § 784-1 et seq.; P. C. §§ 8108-21 et seq.
"Washington Beauty College v. Huse, 195 Wash. 160, 80 P. (2d) 403
(1938); Adams v. Walla Walla, 196 Wash. 268, 82 P. (2d) 584 (1938).
'See Bacot v. Hinds County, 124 Miss. 231, 86 So. 765 (1921); Jackson
& E. R. Co. v. Burns, 148 Miss. 700, 113 So. 908 (1927); writ of error denied
278 U. S. 562 (1928); Love v. Yazoo City, 162 Miss. 65, 138 So. 600 (1931).
See also annotations:: 87 A. L. I. 706; 102 A. L. R. 82.
0'0 Love v. Yazoo City, 162 Miss. 65, 138 So. 600 (1931); Miami v. Romfh,
66 Fla. 280, 63 So. 440 (1913).
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taxpayer who did not appear and contest the validity on this
ground, although the right to do so was open to every taxpayer.
0 9
The substitution for the usual requirement of notice by publica-
tion, of the requirement that the court select certain specified tax-
payers for service in behalf of all is in accordance with equity
practice of long standing, as where the parties are numerous, some
only need to be served or the court can be requested to designate the
proper persons upon whom service is to be made.""' There is also
authority for the appointment of an attorney for absent parties ;'
and the duty of the court to see that the legal questions are
thoroughly explored seems to be clear, although the nature of the
proceeding would appear to place the burden of the affirmative
upon the municipal corporation seeking confirmation."°8
CRIMINAL LAW
By Chapter 74 the legislature has authorized the frank employ-
ment of court reporters for sessions of the grand jury by attaching
an amendment to that effect to Section 982 of the Code of 1881.109
The prosecuting attorney is no longer hampered by the require-
ment that the minutes be kept by a clerk appointed by the grand
jury from their own number"0 and is driven no longer to the
device of appointing a stenographer as a deputy.
The criminal responsibility of the drivers of motor vehicles has
been enlarged by Chapter 154, by adding to the category of mis-
demeanors of this class "to operate a motor vehicle in a negligent
manner." . Negligent operation is defined as meaning the "oper-
ation of a vehicle upon the public highways of the state in such a
manner as to endanger or to be likely to endanger any person or
property." It is also provided that operating in a negligent manner
is a lesser offense than, but included in, operating in a reckless
manner. This statute may not be directed at fostering prosecutions
for negligent driving so much as designing to prevent the escape
from punishment of reckless drivers when the evidence is not suf-
ficient to sustain the statutory requirement that recklessness be
shown by proof of "either a wilful or a wanton disregard of the
safety of persons or property."'
"'Weinberger v. Board of Public Instruction, 93 Fla. 470, 112 So. 253
(1927); State v. Hillsborough County, 113 Fla. 345, 151 So. 712 (1933).
"' Ayers v. Carver, 17 How. 591 (U. S. 1855); Wallace v. Adams, 204
U. S. 415 (1907). By rule of court: Walker v. Sur, (1914) 2 K. B. 930;
Barrett v. Harris, 51 Ont. L. 484, 69 Dom. L. R. 503 (1921).
"'Lopez v. Calzado, 281 S. W. 324 (Tex. Civ. App., 1926).
"See Randolph v. Shelby County, 257 Ky. 297, 77 S. W. (2d) 961 (1934).
1REM. REv. STAT. § 2030, P. C. § 9237.
"'Mather v. King County, 39 Wash. 693, 82 Pac. 121 (1905).
"'See Wash. Laws 1937, c. 189, § 118; REM. REv. STAT. § 6360-118, P. C.
§ 2696-876.
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MISCELLANEOUS
A number of other enactments have not suggested any particular
basis for comment. Reference perhaps should be made to the
statute regulating the taking of tuna fish, an industry that may
assume some proportions in the state ;112 also the statute providing
for the establishment of "mine to market" roads, evidently de-
signed to promote the development of the state's mineral wealth.
Another statute is designed to implement the operation of the
Federal Land Speculation Act'" aimed to prevent speculation in
public lands under the Grand Coulee project." 5  Reference also
seems required in the case of Chapter 118 which amends the
insurance code in providing for compound interest on insurance
policy loans, whether made before or after this act, in view of the
determination in Goodwin v. Northwestern Mut4a2 Life Insurarnce
Co.," that insurance companies could not charge compound interest
on a policy loan in the absence of an express provision therefor
in the policy.
"'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 84, p. 219.
"'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 175, p. 530.
"'Act of Congress, May 27, 1937, c. 269, 50 Stat. 208.
"'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 14, p. 37.*
'196 Wash. 391, 83 P. (2d) 231 (1938).
